The Seventh Circuit has now held that a text message is not a “telephone call” triggering the TCPA’s private Do-Not-Call cause of action, sharply limiting federal DNC text-message claims in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin. The decision conflicts with a broader Ninth Circuit reading of “call” elsewhere in the TCPA, but the courts have not yet squarely divided on the identical statutory subsection—an important qualification for any assessment of Supreme Court review.
The TCPA Statutory Question
Section 227(c)(5) authorizes a private action for a person who receives “more than one telephone call” in a 12-month period in violation of the FCC’s DNC regulations. The interpretive dispute is whether that reference to “telephone call” encompasses an SMS or MMS text, especially when the FCC’s DNC rules and related TCPA provisions use language that at times refers separately to “calls” and “messages.”
The question matters because a prevailing DNC plaintiff may seek actual damages or statutory damages of up to $500 per violation, with trebling available for willful or knowing violations. For texting programs, the availability of a per-message DNC claim can materially change class exposure, settlement value, and compliance priorities.
The Seventh Circuit’s TCPA Ruling
In Steidinger v. Blackstone Medical Services, No. 25-2398 (7th Cir. July 14, 2026), the Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of a consolidated action alleging unwanted marketing calls and texts following opt-outs or National DNC Registry registration. It held that text messages do not fall within Section 227(c)(5)’s private right of action because they are not “telephone calls.”
Judge Thomas Kirsch’s unanimous panel took an original-public-meaning approach: in 1991, the ordinary meaning of a telephone call was sound-based communication, while the first text message was not sent until 1992. The court also found textual support in Congress’s choice to distinguish calls from messages elsewhere in the TCPA, while using only “telephone call” in the Section 227(c)(5) private remedy.
The court did not deny that unwanted texts may be intrusive or that FCC rules may regulate text messaging. Rather, it separated the scope of regulation from the scope of the statutory private cause of action: however objectionable a text campaign may be, Section 227(c)(5) itself does not furnish a private DNC damages claim for texts alone in the Seventh Circuit.
The Broader TCPA Reading
The principal appellate counterweight is the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Howard v. Republican National Committee, 164 F.4th 1119 (9th Cir. 2026). There, the court concluded that texts could qualify as “calls” under TCPA Section 227(b), the provision addressing certain calls made using an automatic telephone dialing system or artificial/prerecorded voice.
Howard reflects a functional, technology-neutral conception of a call: a communication initiated to a cellular telephone number can be a “call” even when delivered as text rather than voice. The Ninth Circuit’s conclusion is consistent with earlier appellate decisions applying Section 227(b) to text messages, including Breda v. Cellco Partnership in the First Circuit and Melito v. Experian Marketing Solutions in the Second Circuit.
But Howard did not interpret Section 227(c)(5)’s phrase “more than one telephone call.” Thus, it is best understood as creating a meaningful doctrinal conflict over the TCPA’s treatment of texts, rather than a clean, same-provision circuit split over the private DNC remedy.
District Court Division
Before Steidinger, district courts had already split on the precise Section 227(c)(5) issue. In Wilson v. Skopos Financial, LLC, the District of Oregon held that unsolicited texts violating the National DNC Registry may support a private claim under Section 227(c)(5).
Other district courts have read the provision narrowly. For example, the Northern District of Georgia in Radvansky v. 1-800-Flowers.com, Inc. concluded that the statute’s text makes only “telephone calls,” not text messages, actionable under Section 227(c)(5); courts in the Eleventh Circuit have increasingly adopted the same position.
Litigation Consequences
For plaintiffs, Steidinger makes venue significantly more important. A putative class representative whose only alleged DNC contacts are text messages will face a dispositive dismissal motion in the Seventh Circuit, while plaintiffs elsewhere will continue pressing the argument that DNC regulations and the statute should be read to encompass texts.
Defendants should expect motions to dismiss or strike text-only DNC theories in Seventh Circuit cases, accompanied by renewed efforts to narrow nationwide class definitions or challenge certification when class members’ claims turn on differing circuit law. The decision may also increase emphasis on alternative theories, including Section 227(b), state mini-TCPA statutes, state DNC laws, deception theories, and claims based on alleged failure to honor opt-out requests.
The decision does not create a safe harbor for marketing texts. Texting campaigns may still face TCPA exposure under other provisions, along with state-law claims and FCC-regulatory risk; moreover, Steidinger concerns the private remedy in Section 227(c)(5), not every federal or state rule applicable to texts.
Compliance Implications
Texting programs should continue to treat National DNC and company-specific opt-outs as operationally significant, Steidinger notwithstanding. The prudent posture is to maintain documented consent, promptly suppress revoked-consent and opt-out numbers, preserve campaign and vendor records, and contractually require aggregators and lead sources to honor suppression data.
The most immediate practical change is risk calibration, not deregulation. A marketer operating nationally still confronts unresolved federal law outside the Seventh Circuit, a developing body of district-court authority, and potentially stricter state-law restrictions even where the federal private DNC theory is unavailable.
Will the Supreme Court Intervene?
A Supreme Court review of the issue is plausible, but it far from inevitable and will certainly not take place any time soon. Supreme Court review of a lower court decision is purely discretionary and is secured through a formal process known as certiorari. In essence, a party seeking Supreme Court review of a decision files a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari asking the Court to order the lower court to transmit the record for review. A grant of certiorari means the Supreme Court will hear the case and decide the legal question presented, usually after merits briefing and oral argument. Under the Court’s “Rule of Four,” certiorari is generally granted when at least four of the nine Justices vote to hear the case.
One of the clearest reasons for granting certiorari is the existence of a genuine federal circuit split, in which two or more federal courts of appeals have reached conflicting holdings on the same important federal issue, as federal law should not differ by geographic circuit. Other factors the Justices examine include whether there is an important, unresolved issue of federal law with substantial nationwide commercial consequences, or a lower court ruling conflicts with Supreme Court precedent.
On the issue of whether texts qualify as calls under the DNC, it is important to remember that Steidinger is the first federal appellate decision squarely holding that Section 227(c)(5) does not permit text-based private DNC claims; the competing Ninth Circuit decision in Howard v. Republican National Com arose under the distinct Section 227(b) provision.
That distinction will likely cause the Court to wait for another circuit court of appeals to decide the exact Section 227(c)(5) question on the other side. A true same-statute, same-remedy conflict—such as a circuit court expressly holding that text messages do support a Section 227(c)(5) private claim—would present a much cleaner vehicle and significantly improve the odds of certiorari.
Still, the issue has the attributes that can attract review: a recurring federal statutory question, substantial nationwide commercial consequences, competing textual methodologies, and a technological mismatch between a 1991 statute and modern text-message marketing. Until a clearer appellate split develops, however, litigants should characterize Supreme Court intervention as increasingly likely over time—not “all but guaranteed.”
